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Andrew Nelson*
INTRODUCTION
Relatively recently, there were concerns that traditional sources of natu-
ral gas would not keep up with the growing energy demands of the United
States.' Consequently, the U.S. energy market was focused on the importa-
tion of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG).2 In response to the excess demand, the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) received thirty applications
to build LNG import terminals around 2008,3 six times the amount operating
in 2007.4 However, as techniques for shale development improved, natural
gas production began to outpace demand.5 In fact, production has increased
to the point that there is now an opportunity for the United States to become
a net exporter of natural gas. 6
Although the United States is in an ideal position to take on a larger role
in the international natural gas market, LNG exporters have met many chal-
lenges. Projects face extensive licensing requirements both for exporting nat-
ural gas and the construction of LNG facilities.7 LNG export projects must
also manage criticisms that LNG exports lead to potential economic, environ-
* Andrew Nelson is an August 2016 Candidate for Juris Doctor at SMU Dedman
School of Law. He received his Bachelor of Arts Degree in Economics from
the University of Texas at Austin in 2013.
1. Matt Salo et al., U.S. LNG Export Projects: Regulatory Outlook and Con-
tracting Mechanisms, 8 TEx. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 61, 62 (2013).
2. See generally Sheila S. Hollis, Liquefied Natural Gas: "The Big Picture" for
Future Development in North America, 2 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 5, 7
(2007).
3. Brenna L. Wolcott, Note & Comment, Out With the Old and In With the New:
Modernizing Liquefied Natural Gas Regulations, 26 COLo. NAT. RESOURCES
ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REv. 139, 140 (2015).
4. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. NATURAL GAS IMPORTS AND EXPORTS: 2007
8 (2009), http://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/importsexports/annual/archives/2009/
ngimpexp07.pdf.
5. Salo, supra note 1, at 62-63.
6. See Sean T. Dixon & Jonathan Panico, Extraction for Exportation: Is There
Such a Thing as "Net Energy Independence"?, 27 A.B.A SEC. NAT. RE-
SOURCES & ENV'T 38, 39 (2013).
7. See, e.g., Les Lo Baugh, U.S. LNG Exports: A New Natural Gas and Regula-
tory Paradigm and Its Geo-Political and Renewable Energy Implications, In-
ternational Mining and Oil & Gas Law, Development, and Investment, PAPER
ROCKY MT. MIN. L. FDN. 14-4 (2013).
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mental, and geo-political damages.8 Lastly, the recent fall in oil prices has
seriously threatened the feasibility of LNG exports, adding yet another obsta-
cle to the United States' participation in the international natural gas market.9
This comment begins by providing the history and development of
LNG. Next, Section II discusses the market for natural gas both domestically
and internationally. Section m presents policy arguments for and against in-
creased LNG exports. Section IV describes the current statutory and regula-
tory framework of LNG exports. Section V examines how the current U.S.
licensing scheme could violate the United States' international trade agree-
ments. Section VI analyzes the effects of low oil prices on natural gas mar-
kets. Finally, Section VII offers projections for natural gas exports and
recommendations on how the United States could simplify the licensing pro-
cess for LNG export applications in the future.
I. LNG AND ITS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) is conventional natural gas that is cooled
to the point it transforms from a vapor to a liquid.o To produce LNG, natural
gas is cooled to approximately -260oF, which condenses the gas to roughly 1/
600th its original size." When extracted from the ground, natural gas is pri-
marily composed of methane, but it contains other components, such as car-
bon dioxide and water.1 2 The first step in the LNG production process is to
clean the natural gas by to eliminating most of the components other than
methane.13 Next, propane is used to precool the methane.14 Finally, a blend of
refrigerants is introduced to the cooled methane, transforming the gas into a
liquid.'5 Once the process is complete, LNG is stored in insulated metal
8. See, e.g., id. at 16; Shani Harmon, Note, Reining in the Natural Gas Bonanza,
Legally: Whether U.S. Law and Policy Restrictions on Natural Gas Exports are
Consistent with International Trade Law, 25 GEO. INT'L ENVT. L. REV. 615,
625-26 (2013).
9. See Ivdn Martin & Daniel Jiminez, Low Oil Prices are Challenging Natural-
Gas Markets, BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP (Mar. 30, 2015), https://www.bcg
perspectives.com/content/articles/energysenvironment low oil pricesschallen
ging-natural-gasmarkets/.
10. Office of Fossil Energy, Liquefied Natural Gas, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, http://
energy.gov/fe/science-innovation/oil-gas/liquefied-natural-gas (last visited Oct.
25, 2015).
11. Id.
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tanks, which keep the gas liquid.16 LNG is typically transported by large
ships that can hold up to 266,000 cubic meters of LNG,17 roughly seven
percent of the gas consumed in the United States on an average day.18 When
natural gas is needed, LNG is converted back into a gaseous state by sending
the liquid through heated pipes.19
The condensed size of LNG allows the commodity to be shipped and
stored more easily than conventional natural gas.20 While there are many
ways to transport natural gas, pipelines have been the most common to trans-
port large quantities.21 However, distance and varying geography limit the
ability of pipelines to reach some markets.22 Liquefaction allows the ship-
ment of large volumes of natural gas over greater distances to reach these
"stranded" markets. 23 Furthermore, the condensed nature of LNG allows the
natural gas to be more efficiently stored when it reaches its destination.24
While LNG may seem like a recent development, it was invented during
the 19th century when British chemist and physicist Michael Faraday lique-
fied various types of gases. 25 In 1873, Carl von Linde invented the first in-
dustrial-scale gas liquefaction machine.26 The first LNG plant was built in
1912, but a plant capable of commercial production was not built until 1941
in Cleveland.27 The Cleveland plant was designed to store LNG until winter,
when customer demand increased.28 The project ended tragically when one
16. Id.; Office of Fossil Energy, supra note 10.
17. Stan Jones, LNG Carriers Called Floating Pipelines, ALASKA NAT. GAS
TRANSP. PROJECTS (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.arcticgas.gov/Ing-carriers-
called-floating-pipelines.
18. How Much Natural Gas is Consumed in the United States?, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN. (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=50&t=8
[hereinafter Natural Gas Consumed].
19. Hollis, supra note 2, at 8.
20. Michelle Foss, Introduction to LNG, 8 CENTER FOR ENERGY EcoNoMics, Bu-
REAU OF ECONOMIC GEOLOGY, JACKSON SCHOOL OF GEOSCIENCES, THE UNI-
VERSITY OF TEXAS AT AuSTIN (Jan. 2007), http://www.beg.utexas.edu/energy
econ/Ing/documents/CEEINTRODUCTIONTOLNGFINAL.pdf.
21. See James Conca, Pick Your Poison for Crude-Pipeline, Rail, Truck or Boat,
FORBES (Apr. 26, 2014, 10:35 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconcal
2014/04/26/pick-your-poison-for-crude-pipeline-rail-truck-or-boat/.
22. See Office of Fossil Energy, supra note 10; 3-56 Brian D. O'Neill, Energy
Law and Transactions, § 56.01.
23. See Office of Fossil Energy, supra note 10; O'Neill, supra note 22.
24. O'Neill, supra note 22.
25. See Foss, supra note 20, at 13.
26. See id.
27. Baugh, supra note 7, at 1.
28. The Oil Drum, supra note 12.
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of the tanks failed, leaking 1.2 million gallons of LNG into the city.29 In the'
aftermath of the disaster, which killed 128 people and destroyed thousands of
homes, the LNG industry went dormant for several years. 30
Water transportation of LNG began with a joint venture between Conti-
nental Oil Co. and Union Stock and Transit Co. in the mid-1950s.31 The
purpose of this venture was to ship LNG from the Gulf Coast to Chicago,
where it would be vaporized and used for the food processing industry. 32
However, this project was terminated when the U.S. Food and Drug Admin-
istration refused to permit this use of LNG due to fears of food contamina-
tion.33 In the late 1950s, the industry's attention turned toward international
trade when an opportunity arose to sell LNG to the United Kingdom.34 In
1959, the Methane Pioneer, a converted World War II freighter, transported a
shipment of LNG from Louisiana to England.35 The success of this project
proved the feasibility of international shipments and encouraged the expan-
sion of the industry.36
In the late 1960s, the United States projected declines in the natural gas
supply and companies introduced plans for importing LNG.37 In 1968, the
Methane Pioneer brought the first shipment of LNG to the United States into
the Boston Harbor.38 Natural gas prices increased in the late 1970s due to
supply shortages.39 Consequently, there was another surge in proposals to
import. natural gas. 40 Before these projects were completed, however, it be-
came apparent that "the scarcity of natural gas in the U.S. market place was
principally due to two factors: (1) counterproductive state and federal regula-
tors of natural gas; and (2) the tendency of major oil companies to drill for oil
and not natural gas because they considered gas more of a nuisance than a
source of profit."41 Once regulations and laws were changed to address these
issues, natural gas prices declined as the supply increased.42
29. Id.
30. Id.




35. Foss, supra note 20, at 14.
36. See Baugh, supra note 7, at 1.
37. O'Neill, supra note 22.
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By the early 2000s, the United States was again anticipating a need for
more natural gas. 43 In fact, "the Energy Information Administration (EIA)
projected a need to import 229 [billion cubic feet (Bcf)] by 2002, then doub-
ling to 540 Bcf by the end of 2003."44 However, since only four import facili-
ties existed at that time, it was expected that the United States would need to
expand its import capabilities.45 Many import terminals were proposed, but
most were never constructed.46 Due to regulatory challenges and changes to
the U.S. natural gas market, even those that were constructed never received
significant LNG imports.47
II. DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL NATURAL GAS MARKETS
A. U.S. Market
Less than ten years ago, the United States was primarily an LNG im-
porter.48 High domestic natural gas prices led to imports of over 700 Bcf in
2007.49 This trend was expected to continue for the foreseeable future.so
However, there have been vast unanticipated changes in the United States
natural gas market due to advances in horizontal drilling technology and the
increased use of hydraulic fracturing.51 Hydraulic fracturing involves drilling
a well and subsequently pumping hydraulically pressurized fluids into a geo-
logical formation.52 The pressure causes the rock to crack, creating fractures
that are held open with a propping agent.53 These open fractures improve the
flow of oil or natural gas, making unconventional resources economically
viable.54
Hydraulic fracturing has been used since the 1940s, but combining hy-
draulic fracturing and the more recently developed horizontal drilling tech-
43. Id.
44. Baugh, supra note 7, at 2.
45. Id. at 2-3.
46. Id. at 3.
47. Id.
48. See Hollis, supra note 2, at 6-7.
49. U.S. Liquefied Natural Gas Imports, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (May 29,
2015), http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9l03us2A.htm [hereinafter LNG
Imports].
50. Hollis, supra note 2, at 9.
51. Christopher Goncalves, Breaking Rules and Changing the Game: Will Shale
Gas Rock the World?, 35 ENERGY L.J. 225, 227 (2014).
52. Hydraulic Fracturing Background Information, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/wellshy
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nologies has dramatically increased the production of natural gas in the
United States.55 In fact, production of natural gas increased from nineteen
trillion cubic feet (Tcf) per year in 2006 to twenty-seven Tcf per year in
2014.56 This increase in domestic production has led to a substantial decline
in natural gas imports.57 According to an EIA forecast, domestic production
is growing faster than demand and by 2022 the United States could become a
net exporter of natural gas.58
Energy markets constantly fluctuate, a fact demonstrated by the recent
fall in oil prices.59 Since June 2014, the price of oil has dropped roughly 50%
to around $50.60 Prices have been dropping for a variety of reasons, includ-
ing: decrease of global demand, turmoil in several oil producing countries,
the United States' increasing supply, and OPEC's unwillingness to limit pro-
duction to stabilize the market.61 Additionally, the Iran Nuclear deal could
further depress oil prices.62 These low oil prices' substantial effect on LNG
exports is a topic explored in depth in Section VI.
B. International Market
Global demand for natural gas has been growing, particularly in devel-
oping economies.63 The largest import market by far is found in Asia-spe-
cifically Japan, South Korea, and China.64 Europe and South America also
55. Adam Eldean, Can the United States Control Its Natural Gas?: International
Trade Implications of Restrictions on Liquefied Natural Gas Exports, 54 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 439, 445 (2014).
56. U.S. Natural Gas Marketed Production, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (May 29,
2015), http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9050us2a.htm.
57. Dixon & Panico, supra note 6, at 40.
58. Id. at 39.
59. See Clifford Krauss, Oil Prices: What's Behind the Drop? Simple Economics,
NY TIMES (July 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/business/
energy-environment/oil-prices.html; Markets, Energy & Oil, BLOOMBERG
Bus., http://www.bloomberg.com/energy (last visited Oct. 19, 2015).
60. Id.
61. Why the Oil Price is Falling, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.econ-
omist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/12/economist-explains-4.
62. Geoffrey Smith, Oil Prices Slide on Iran Nuclear Deal, TIME (July 14, 2015),
http://time.com/3956883/iran-deal-oil/.
63. Noah T. Jaffe, Note, U.S. Natural Gas Exports are in the Public Interest: The
Reasons and Ways that the Department of Energy Should Modify Its Standard
for Reviewing Applications to Export Liquefied Natural Gas, 12 GEO. J.L. &
PUB. PoL'Y 785, 789 (2014); Harmon, supra note 8, at 624.
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import a significant amount of natural gas.6 5 The export market is currently
dominated by just a few countries, including: Qatar, Malaysia, Australia, Ni-
geria, and Russia.66 Many of these countries have state-owned oil and gas
firms, which gives them certain trade advantages.67 For example, they can
make production and consumption decisions based only partially on econom-
ics.68 They also have much greater access to capital.69 However, these coun-
tries often have substantial exploration and production limitations, such as
government interference or a lack of technology or infrastructure.70 The
United States is relatively free from these limitations, putting it in a good
position to capture a significant share of the international market.71
C. Significant Differences Between Markets
One of the main differences between the U.S. and international natural
gas markets is the price of natural gas. 7 2 Over the past five years, the natural
gas prices in the United States have generally stayed around $4 per million
British Thermal Unit (MMBtu).73 In stark contrast, European and Asian
prices have been around three times U.S. prices.74 This vast variation in
prices has led to great interest in exporting LNG from U.S. producers.75
Before the rise in domestic production suppressed U.S. prices, exporting
LNG provided little economic incentive.76 However, large spreads cover liq-
uefaction and transportation costs and then some, making exports very
profitable.77
65. Id.
66. Id. at 8.
67. Michael Levi, The Hamilton Project: A Strategy for U.S. Natural Gas Exports




70. Jaffe, supra note 63, at 789-91; Claudia A. Duncan, Note, Let's Not Reinvent
the Wheel: Harnessing the Current Domestic regulatory Framework for the
International Export of Liquefied Natural Gas, 46 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 611,
620 (2013).
71. See Jaffe, supra note 63, at 790.
72. See Levi, supra note 67, at 5.
73. Selected National Average Natural Gas Prices, 2010-2015, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN. (July 2015), http://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/monthly/pdf/table_03.pdf.
74. Goncalves, supra note 51, at 229.
75. Levi, supra note 67, at 8.
76. See id.
77. Goncalves, supra note 51, at 229.
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Typically, due to competition, commodity prices will "converge with
the marginal cost of supplying them. . . ."78 In other words, suppliers with a
lower marginal cost of producing and delivering natural gas will push down
prices, making U.S. exports uneconomic.79 A previous study suggested that
the spread in prices would remain open for some time,80 but this study was
done prior to the collapse of oil prices, which has narrowed the spread in
prices significantly. 81 Now the question is whether U.S. LNG exports can
compete in this low oil price environment.
Another significant difference between markets is the pricing method
used in natural gas contracts. For example, a large portion of international
gas prices is indexed to oil prices.82 This means that the price of natural gas
fluctuates with changes in the oil price.83 Recently, Europe has started to
move away from oil indexing, but the practice is still prominent in Asia.84 On
the other hand, natural gas transactions in the United States typically use spot
prices.85 A spot price is simply the price at which a commodity can be trans-
acted and delivered on right now. 86 The most commonly used spot price is
the U.S. Henry Hub Price.87 These indexing differences affect LNG contract
structures between U.S. exporters and international buyers,88 and leave the
spread in prices particularly susceptible a drop in oil prices.89
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Extensive controversy surrounds LNG exportation, and recently, the
subject has been increasingly in the public spotlight. LNG exports would
have significant impacts on the United States.90 Accordingly, there are pow-
78. Levi, supra note 67, at 8.
79. Id.
80. See id.
81. Martdn & Jim6nez, supra note 9, at 2.
82. Goncalves, supra note 51, at 229-30.
83. See Andy Hilleary, Natural Gas Prices: Oil Indexed or Spot?, ENERGY AcuITY
BLOG (Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.energyacuity.com/blog/bid/237108/Natural-
Gas-Prices-Oil-Indexed-or-Spot.
84. Goncalves, supra note 51, at 238-39.
85. Hilleary, supra note 83.
86. Spot Price, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/spotprice.asp
(last visited Oct. 19, 2015).
87. Goncalves, supra note 51, at 230.
88. See id. at 237-40.
89. Mart6n & Jim6nez, supra note 9, at 2.
90. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., EFFECT OF INCREASED NATURAL GAS EXPORTS ON
DOMESTIC ENERGY MARKETS 6 (2012), http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/
04/f0/fe eiaIng.pdf [hereinafter EIA STUDY].
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erful partisans on both sides of the issue and the disagreements can be broken
down into three main areas: economic, environmental, and geo-political.91
A. Economic Impacts
One incentive of increasing LNG exports is the apparent financial op-
portunity for natural gas producers.92 The EIA has estimated that from 2015
to 2032, LNG exports could increase revenues to natural gas producers by
$14 billion to $32 billion.93 Opponents, however, stress that negative eco-
nomic effects are an issue as well.94 For example, the EIA found that in-
creased LNG exports would lead to increased domestic natural gas prices.95
Critics argue that these higher natural gas prices could negatively affect the
economy by forcing homeowners and other consumers to decrease their con-
sumption.96 In particular, these critics fear that increased prices would hurt
industries such as manufacturing that rely on cheap natural gas.9 7 However,
these criticisms are largely unsubstantiated. Natural gas prices are expected
to increase regardless of additional exports,98 and "any upward pressure on
prices will be offset by a reduction in domestic price volatility."99 Also, stud-
ies show that it is unlikely that price increases will significantly impact en-
ergy intensive industries.oo Lastly, an increase in domestic natural gas prices
may actually be beneficial, because the current surplus of natural gas artifi-
cially depresses domestic prices.iOi These artificially low prices lead to inef-
91. See Rebecca Kennedy, Crossing the Line: Selective Licensing of Liquefied Nat-
ural Gas Exportation Facilities is Unconstitutional, 14 U. Prrr. J. TECH. L. &
POL'Y 128, 131-33 (2013).
92. Wolcott, supra note 3, at 141.
93. EIA STUDY, supra note 90, at 16.
94. See Harmon, supra note 8, at 624.
95. EIA STUDY, supra note 90, at 6.
96. Michael P. Smith, Note, Consistently Inconsistent: U.S. LNG Exportation Pol-
icy and the WTO, 55 VA. J. INT'L L. 257, 263 (2014); EIA STUDY, supra note
90, at 11.
97. See Wolcott, supra note 3, at 156.
98. EIA STUDY, supra note 90, at 6.
99. Wolcott, supra note 3, at 153 (citing Application of Cameron LNG, LLC for
Long-Term, Multi-Contract Authorization to Export Liquefied Natural Gas to
Non-Free Trade Agreement Countries at 21, Cameron LNG, LLC, FE Docket
No. 11-162-LNG (Dec. 21, 2011), http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/05/
122/15_671ng-nfta_1.pdf).
100. Jaffe, supra note 63, at 795.
101. Kennedy, supra note 91, at 131-32.
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ficiencies in the market, such as simply burning the gas at the well site
because it is more economical to waste the gas than to produce it.102
Another potential economic impact of LNG exports is an increase in
GDP. Selling domestic products to foreign entities serves as a "wealth trans-
fer to the U.S. from abroad."103 Even when taking into account the higher
domestic natural gas prices, which would put downward pressure on any
GDP increases, the U.S. GDP would increase because of greater LNG ex-
ports. 04 Critics point out that while the GDP gains may seem large, they
represent a very small percentage of the overall GDP.105 They argue that
economic benefits apply mostly to oil and gas companies.106 Even when eco-
nomic gains are limited to a small group, though, any increase in GDP can
benefit a country.
Proponents and critics of increased LNG exports also disagree about the
potential impacts on domestic employment. The U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE), for instance, projected that increased exports "could create hundreds
of thousands of jobs."107 These jobs would theoretically come from the natu-
ral gas industry through increased production, processing, and transportation
of natural gas, as well as from the construction and operation of the LNG
facilities.108 However, opponents argue that these jobs would exist regardless
of LNG exports because of the growing domestic demand for natural gas.1 09
Furthermore, any actual employment increases are likely to be offset by de-
creases in other market sectors due to the higher natural gas prices.110
LNG exports could create several other possible economic benefits. For
example, opening up international exports would provide an additional mar-
ket for domestic gas that might not otherwise be produced.I This would be
beneficial when domestic demand is low.112 Also, studies show that increased
102. Jaffe, supra note 63, at 795.
103. Id. at 793.
104. NERA Econ. Consulting, Macroeconomic Impacts of LNG Exports from the
United States, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY 56-57 (Dec. 3, 2012), http://energy.gov/
sites/prod/files/2013/04/f/nera_1ng-report.pdf [hereinafter NERA Study].
105. Smith, supra note 96, at 263.
106. Id.
107. Wolcott, supra note 3, at 155.
108. Id.; Duncan, supra note 70, at 625.
109. Jaffe, supra note 63, at 794.
110. Id.
111. Deloitte Ctr. for Energy Solutions & Deloitte MarketPoint LLC, Made in
America: The Economic Impact of LNG Exports from the United States,
DELOITTE 19 (2011), http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Docu-
ments/energy-resources/us-er-made-in-america.pdf [hereinafter Deloitte
Report].
112. Wolcott, supra note 3, at 154.
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LNG exports would lead to higher aggregate consumption, which typically
indicates "higher economic activity and more purchasing power for consum-
ers."I 13Aggregate investment may also increase, although this would most
likely occur only in the short term.1 4 Construction projects to build new
LNG plants, or to convert current gasification plants to liquefaction plants
will drive up investment, but eventually the higher natural gas prices will
cause investment to balance out."t5
To address these economic concerns, the DOE commissioned a study to
examine the macroeconomic effects of LNG exports (2012 LNG Export
Study).1 6 The 2012 LNG Export Study consisted of two parts. The first part
was conducted by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) and
used strictly a U.S. and North America-based model.117 The second part of
the study, conducted by National Economic Research Associates Economic
Consulting (NERA), used a global model and utilized the EIA study in its
analysis.118 Weighing the factors, the 2012 LNG Export Study concluded that
in all scenarios, "the U.S. was projected to gain net economic benefits from
allowing LNG exports."ll 9 Furthermore, the economic benefits continued to
increase as exports increased.120 Although opponents claim the study has
many flaws, the DOE continues to rely on it when reviewing applications.121
B. Environmental Impacts
Several parties, such as the Sierra Club, strongly oppose the expansion
of LNG exportation due to environmental concerns.1 22 However, until rela-
tively recently, environmental groups welcomed the increased use of natural
gas. 123 This viewpoint existed because the groups saw natural gas as a bridge
fuel, believing it to have fewer environmental impacts than conventional oil
or coal.124 While "natural gas emits less carbon than coal at the point of
combustion," environmental groups now fear that when taking into account
113. NERA Study, supra note 104, at 57.
114. Id. at 58-59.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1; see EIA STUDY, supra note 90, at 1.
117. Baugh, supra note 7, at 14.
118. Id.
119. NERA Study, supra note 104, at 1.
120. Id.
121. Wolcott, supra note 3, at 152.
122. Eldean, supra note 55, at 449.
123. Jaffe, supra note 63, at 796.
124. Eldean, supra note 55, at 441.
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the emissions from the production of shale gas, natural gas could be more
harmful than coal.125
One of the greatest concerns is that increased LNG exports will en-
courage more natural gas production in the United States. This increased pro-
duction would require shale gas development through the use of fracing.126
Environmentalists, though, argue that increased production could lead to
many negative effects.127 For instance, air pollution correlates with the level
of natural gas production.128 The release of methane, which is roughly twenty
times more hazardous than carbon dioxide, is particularly concerning.129
Methane not only emits during the production and distribution process, but it
can also leak from LNG storage tanks.130
Natural gas production can also damage water resources. The fracing
process uses an enormous amount of water, requiring up to five million gal-
lons of water per well.13i In addition, the fluid used in fracing contains sev-
eral additives that could potentially contaminate ground and surface water. 132
Another concern involves the impact drilling sites can have on the surround-
ing community and natural landscape.133 For example, earthquakes have been
linked to drilling operations.134 Lastly, some environmentalists worry that in-
creased natural gas prices will lead to increased use of coal for electricity
production. 135
However, the environmental impact of LNG exportation may not be as
bad as critics argue. An increase in LNG exports could cause several positive
environmental impacts. First, the higher domestic prices associated with
LNG exports will likely lead to a decrease in total energy consumption for
the United States.1 36 Also, LNG exports could reduce the total amount of coal
used globally.137 For instance, one effect of low natural gas prices in the
United States is that coal exports to Europe have increased.138 Therefore, "the
125. Id.
126. Id. at 449.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Smith, supra note 96, at 265-66.
130. Id. at 266.
131. Wolcott, supra note 3, at 162.
132. Eldean, supra note 55, at 449-50.
133. Id. at 450.
134. .Id.
135. Harmon, supra note 8, at 627.
136. EIA STUDY, supra note 90, at 18.
137. Eldean, supra note 55, at 452.
138. Id.
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coal that is displaced by natural gas in the United States is still being burned
elsewhere."l39 Increased LNG exports could reduce the amount of coal being
used internationally, by providing cheaper natural gas to other countries.14 0
Environmental groups would prefer renewable energy sources substi-
tuted for natural gas.141 However, the low price of natural gas has hindered
the growth of renewable energy.1 42 Historically, coal has been the main
source for generating electricity in the United States.143 Due to the environ-
mental consequences associated with coal, Congress and the states enacted
several regulations that led coal plants to shut down unless they were im-
proved or converted to natural gas plants.144 These regulations, along with
state and federal programs reducing costs, have increased the use of renewa-
ble energy in the United States.145 However, despite all of these efforts, "the
cost of renewable energy remains relatively high."146 Furthermore, the reduc-
tion in the use of coal left a portion of the market share open.1 47 Unfortu-
nately for environmentalists, the EIA projected that renewable energy will
only "capture approximately 1/3 of the potential market while natural gas is
expected to capture 2/3 of that market."l4 8 This is due to the fact that renewa-
ble energy remains much more costly than natural gas.1 49 Therefore, an in-
crease in the price of natural gas in the United States may lead to renewable
energy becoming more cost effective.50
C. Geo-Political Impacts
The final policy consideration is the impact LNG exports could have on
geo-political relations. On the one hand, critics of increased LNG exports
argue that the United States should take advantage of this opportunity for
energy security and energy independence.151 While the U.S. shale reserves





143. Baugh, supra note 7, at 18.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 19.
147. Id. at 21.
148. Id.
149. Baugh, supra note 7, at 21.
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151. Wolcott, supra note 3, at 159; Harmon, supra note 8, at 629.
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able and affordable energy prices."52 Accordingly, the United States needs
to ensure that it can maintain supplies of affordable natural gas in the event
of an interruption in the international natural gas market.153 Currently, natural
gas markets are regional, not global, so a disruption in foreign markets has
little impact on domestic markets.154 Critics argue that increasing LNG ex-
ports places the United States at the mercy of volatile international markets,
which could destabilize domestic prices.155
Increasing LNG exports could also have broad implications for our rela-
tionships with foreign countries. First, we could strengthen relationships with
our allies by providing them with cheaper, reliable energy. 5 6 As some parties
have pointed out, it would be hypocritical for the United States to place re-
strictions on other countries' natural gas imports while encouraging our allies
to limit their imports from hostile countries.' 5 On a related note, increasing
LNG exports could also disrupt the monopolies that some hostile nations
hold over our allies.158 For example, many countries in Europe are highly
dependent on Russia for natural gas.i 59 Russia has repeatedly exploited this
dependency to influence foreign policy.160 Likewise, Iran has continued to
use surrounding countries to circumvent U.S. sanctions.161 Because these
countries are dependent on Iran for natural gas, it is difficult to get them to
cooperate with U.S. sanctions.162 Lastly, Russia is trying to win contracts in
East Asia to gain influence in the area.1 6 3 Increasing U.S. exports would help
alleviate these hostile influences and increase American influence in the
region.
IV. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Much of the controversy related to LNG exports stems from the process
of gaining permission from the appropriate agencies. LNG imports and ex-
ports are regulated at both the federal and state levels.164 This section will
152. Harmon, supra note 8, at 629.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.; Wolcott, supra note 3, at 159.
156. Wolcott, supra note 3, at 156.
157. See Baugh, supra note 7, at 17.
158. See Wolcott, supra note 3, at 156-57.
159. Id. at 157.
160. Id.
161. Jaffe, supra note 63, at 799.
162. Id. at 799.
163. Id.
164. Baugh, supra note 7, at 4.
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discuss the licensing process for an LNG export project and examine the
structure of federal and state requirements.
A. Authorization to Import/Export LNG
The Natural Gas Act of 1938 (NGA) governs the export and import of
natural gas.1 65 Section 3 of the NGA gives the DOE's Office of Fossil Energy
the authority to grant authorization to importlexport natural gas.1 66 Under the
NGA, the general standard used when reviewing applications to import or
export natural gas is the following:
No person shall export any natural gas from the United States to a
foreign country or import any natural gas from a foreign country
without first having secured an order of the Commission authoriz-
ing it to do so. The Commission shall issue such an order upon
application, unless, after opportunity for hearing, it finds that the
proposed exportation or importation will not be consistent with
public interest. The Commission may by its order grant such ap-
plication, in whole or in part, with such modification and upon
such terms and conditions as the Commission may find necessary
or appropriate, and may from time to time, after opportunity for
hearing, and for good cause shown, make such supplemental order
in the premises as it may find necessary or appropriate.167
Accordingly, individuals looking to export LNG from the United States
must file an application with the DOE.168 The elements of the application are
described in 10 C.F.R. § 590.202.169 An application must contain, among
other things: (1) the exact legal name of the applicant; (2) the names, titles,
and mailing addresses of a maximum of two persons for the official service
list; (3) a statement describing the action sought from the DOE's Office of
Fossil Energy; (4) the justification for such actions and the reasons the action
is not inconsistent with the public interest; and (5) the Office of Fossil En-
ergy's docket number, if applicable.170 In addition to these requirements, the
applicant must include the following information to the extent that it is appli-
cable: a statement describing the proposed scope of the project, including the
volumes of natural gas involved, the dates of commencement and completion
of the proposed import or export, and the facilities to be utilized or con-
structed; the source and security of the natural gas supply to be exported;
identification of all the transactional participants; the terms of the transac-
165. Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717b (2012).
166. Salo, supra note 1, at 67.
167. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(a).
168. Salo, supra note 1, at 68.
169. 10 C.F.R. § 590.202(a) (2012); id.
170. 10 C.F.R. § 590.202(a).
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tion; the lack of a national or regional need for the gas; and a statement
regarding the potential environmental impacts of the project.171
The focus of the DOE's review is whether or not a project is in the
public interest. 172 Previously, all natural gas applications were subject to the
same review process, but that changed as the United States began to form
free trade agreements (FTA) in the 1990s.173 With the Energy Policy Act of
1992, Congress created an expedited approval process for applications to im-
port or export natural gas to countries with FTAs.174
An FTA is an agreement between countries regarding certain obliga-
tions that affect trade. 175 Under an FTA, a country will agree to give national
treatment to another country's goods, meaning imported goods and locally-
produced goods are treated equally.176 The countries with which the United
States has FTAs requiring national treatment for trade in natural gas are:
Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Chile, Columbia, Dominican Republic, El Salva-
dor, Guatemala, Honduras, Jordan, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Oman,
Panama, Peru, Republic of Korea, and Singapore.177 The goal of an FTA is to
reduce barriers and to create a more stable trading environment.178 Accord-
ingly, Congress justified the expedited approval process by declaring that it
would encourage greater participation in the U.S. natural gas market.179
Under the expedited approval process, an application to a country with
an FTA that requires national treatment for trade in natural gas is automati-
cally "deemed to be consistent with the public interest."18o Also such applica-
tions "shall be granted without modification or delay."I8l Therefore, there is a
"conclusive presumption, which cannot be overcome, that LNG exports to
FTA countries are in the public interest."182 Since this conclusive presump-
171. Id.
172. See 15 U.S.C. § 717b(a).
173. Harmon, supra note 8, at 619.
174. Id.
175. U.S. Free Trade Agreements, EXPORT.Gov, http://www.export.gov/%5C/FTA/
index.asp (last updated Jan. 11, 2013).
176. Principles of the Trading System, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, https://www
.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/fact2_e.htm (last visited Oct. 19,
2015).
177. Pieridae Energy, LTD, DOE/FE Order No. 3639, at 9 (May 22, 2015), http://
energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/05/f22/ord3639.pdf [hereinafter Order No.
3639].
178. U.S. Free Trade Agreements, supra note 175.
179. Harmon, supra note 8, at 619.
180. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(c).
181. Id.
182. Wolcott, supra note 3, at 145-46.
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tion generally allows the application to bypass the public notice and other
hearing-type procedures, applications to FTA countries can receive approval
in less than a month.183
The application process to export natural gas to countries without an
FTA is much more extensive. As these applications do not receive the benefit
of an expedited review process, they are subject to the comprehensive public
interest review.184 The DOE has consistently held that there is a rebuttable
presumption that a proposed application is in the public interest.185 Therefore,
opponents must overcome the presumption in order to stop an application
from being granted.1 86 The DOE publishes notice of each application in the
Federal Register and seeks feedback, which will be considered in determin-
ing public interest.187 Opponents must have at least thirty days to file such
feedback, but the DOE typically provides a sixty-day comment period.188
To determine if an application meets the public interest requirement, the
DOE "conducts a public interest review."l89 The NGA does not define the
term "public interest,"190 and the only criteria the DOE explicitly considers is
the domestic need for natural gas. 19 1 However, the DOE will also consider a
wide range of other factors including: energy security; impact on the econ-
omy, consumers, and industry; job creation; balance of trade; international
considerations; environmental considerations; and consistency with the
DOE's policy of promoting competition in the marketplace through free
trade.192 As can be seen by the policy discussion above, these factors are
heavily debated.
One aspect of the DOE's public interest review that has received signifi-
cant attention recently is the environmental considerations element. Since is-
suing a license to export natural gas is a highly influential action by a federal
agency, the DOE must comply with the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) and assess the potential environmental impacts of an application.193
To assess the environmental impacts of a project, the DOE may use the more
rigorous Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), or an Environmental As-
183. Salo, supra note 1, at 73.
184. See 15 U.S.C. § 717b(a).
185. Wolcott, supra note 3, at 146.
186. Id.
187. Salo, supra note 1, at 76-77.
188. Id. at 77.
189. Harmon, supra note 8, at 620.
190. Baugh, supra note 7, at 5.
191. Salo, supra note 1, at 78.
192. Harmon, supra note 8, at 620-21.
193. Id. at 621.
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sessment (EA).194 Applications requiring major operational changes to facili-
ties require an EIS, while all other applications simply require an EA.195
However, the DOE/FE often piggylacks on the environmental review of
other agencie.1 96 For example, reviewing a recent application, the DOE al-
lowed an application that would result in major operational changes to get a
less extensive EA when the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
already received an EIS for the same proposal.197 In response, environmental
groups are pursuing legal action, which creates uncertainty about the envi-
ronmental review required to receive a license from the DOE to export natu-
ral gas.1 9 8
B. Construction and Operation of LNG Facilities
While the DOE has the authority to regulate the actual trade of LNG,
either the FERC or the Maritime Administration and the U.S. Coast Guard
regulate the LNG import or export facilities.199 If the actual facility is located
within state waters, the FERC has approval authority and the NGA applies.200
If the facility is located beyond state waters, the Maritime Administration
and the U.S. Coast Guard have approval authority and the Deepwater Port
Act (DWPA) applies.201
Through the DOE Act and section 3 of the NGA, the FERC has the
exclusive authority over the "siting, construction, expansion, or operation of
an LNG terminal."202 Like the DOE, the FERC must make a public interest
determination, although the process is much less intensive.203 When review-
ing an application, the FERC considers whether the terminal "will improve
access to supplies of natural gas, serve new market demand, enhance the
reliability, security and/or flexibility of the applicant's pipeline system, im-
prove the dependability of international energy trade, or enhance competition
within the United States for natural gas transportation or supply."204 The
FERC review balances public interests with adverse impacts.205 Therefore, if
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See id. at 621-22.
197. Id.
198. Harmon, supra note 8, at 622.
199. Sean Dixon, Liquefied Natural Gas Exports and Export Facilities: A Statutory
Framework, 43 No. 6 ABA TRENDS 6, 6 (2012).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717b(e)(1) (2012); Salo, supra note 1, at 89.
203. Dixon & Panico, supra note 6, at 40.
204. 18 C.F.R. § 153.7 (2012).
205. Dixon, Liquefied Natural Gas Exports, supra note 199, at 7.
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no substantial adverse impacts are identified, the FERC allows the market to
decide whether a project is constructed.206
While both the DOE/FE and the FERC have to comply with the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the FERC is effectively the lead
agency for environmental considerations.207 NEPA requires agencies to ana-
lyze the potential environmental impacts of proposed federal actions.20 8 As
part of the NEPA review, an agency must either prepare an EA or an EIS.209
An EIS is a much more comprehensive analysis, as it must detail the environ-
mental impacts of a proposed action as well as alternatives to the proposal. 2 10
An EIS can cost millions of dollars to produce and take up to a year to
complete. 211 However, an EIS is only required when a project will constitute
a "major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human envi-
ronment."21 2 Since many federal actions do not have significant impacts,
agencies will often first develop a less detailed EA to determine whether an
EIS is necessary. 2 13
The FERC has a mandatory pre-filing process that requires applicants to
begin the NEPA review process six-months prior to filing for authoriza-
tion.214 This allows the FERC to identify critical issues early in the applica-
tion process.215 Once the pre-filing requirements have been met, the FERC
assigns the applicant a docket number, begins a preliminary review, shares
information about the proposed terminal with the community, and holds
meetings where the public can provide comments. 216 Once the DOE and the
FERC approve a project, it is the FERC's responsibility to monitor the con-
struction and operations of the terminal.217
206. Id.
207. Daniel A. Hagan & Corey Neal, Inside DOE's Proposal for Liquefied Natural
Gas, LAw360 (July 7, 2014, 11:41 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/
549790/inside-doe-s-proposal-for-liquefied-natural-gas-exports.
208. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (02012); Maureen 0. Brill, Assessing the Scope of the
National Environmental policy Act: Recent Attempts by Environmentalists to
Add Climate Change Considerations into NEPA Review, 54 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 409, 412 (2014).
209. Salo, supra note 1, at 92.
210. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.2 (2012); Brill, supra note 208, at 412.
211. Salo, supra note 1, at 92.
212. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.3.
213. Brill, supra note 208, at 432.
214. See 18 C.F.R. § 157.21.
215. Salo, supra note 1, at 91.
216. Id. at 92.
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LNG terminals located on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) are gov-
erned by the DWPA instead of the NGA.218 There are several agencies that
play a role in the licensing of an offshore LNG facility. First, the Maritime
Administration (MARAD) makes the final decision "concerning proposals,
licenses, construction, operation, and decommissioning."219 In order to issue
a license, the MARAD must determine the following: the applicant's finan-
cial responsibility; that the applicant will follow applicable laws, regulations,
and license conditions; whether the application will be in the national inter-
est; that the application does not interfere with international navigation; and
that the terminal will be constructed and operated using best available tech-
nology, so as to minimize the adverse impact on the environment.220 Next,
the U.S. Coast Guard is responsible for promulgating regulations and is the
lead agency for complying with NEPA.221 Finally, an offshore port will likely
have to connect to onshore facilities. To obtain a license for these facilities,
DWPA applicants must file a separate application with the FERC.222
C. Recent Changes to DOE Application Process
In August 2014, the DOE announced a procedural change in their appli-
cation process. 223 As described above, both the DOE and the FERC must
complete a NEPA review, but the FERC is the lead agency for conducting
the review and analyzing the environmental impacts of the project.224 The
DOE's previous practice was to issue a conditional authorization on a first
come, first serve basis.225 Essentially, the DOE would choose an application
based on the order it was received and start a preliminary analysis of all
public interest factors, while excluding any environmental issues.226 The
DOE would then grant a conditional authorization to export natural gas, con-
tingent on the project receiving approval from the FERC.227 Once FERC ap-
proval was granted, the DOE would reconsider the public interest factors in
218. Sean T. Dixon, Deepwater Liquefied Natural Gas Ports and the Shifting U.S.
Liquefied Natural Gas Market, 17 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 1, 5 (2011).
219. Id. at 5-6; 33 U.S.C. § 1503 (2012).
220. 33 U.S.C. § 1503(c).
221. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 148-150 (2012); Dixon, Deepwater Liquefied Natural Gas
Ports, supra note 218, at 6.
222. See Salo, supra note 1, at 67.
223. See Procedures for Liquefied Natural Gas Export Decisions, 79 FED. REG. 48,
132 (Aug. 15, 2014) [hereinafter Procedures].
224. Hagan, supra note 207.
225. See Procedures, supra note 223, at 48, 132; see also Hagan, supra note 207.
226. See Procedures, supra note 223, at 48, 132-33.
227. See id. at 48, 133.
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light of the FERC's environmental review, thereafter making its final
decision.228
In response to concerns that environmental factors were not being bal-
anced equally against all other public interest factors,229 the DOE is no longer
issuing conditional authorizations.2 30 Instead, the DOE now only considers a
project after the applicant has completed the FERC process. 231 Furthermore,
the DOE is altering the order it analyzes applications.232 Instead of first
come, first serve; the DOE will review applications "in the order they be-
come ready for final action."233 In doing so, the DOE hopes to prioritize more
advanced projects. 234
D. State Regulations
The LNG regulatory process is not solely under federal control, as states
have various opportunities to intervene in the application process. 235 For ex-
ample, under many of the federal authorizations, an applicant must comply
with various state regulations.236 States, then, may interfere, effectively veto-
ing an LNG project.237 Therefore, an applicant for an LNG import or export
terminal needs not only focus on DOE and FERC approval, but also must
consider the possible state regulatory hurdles that could derail the project.
V. POTENTIAL INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW VIOLATIONS
The current regulatory process for LNG exports potentially violates re-
quirements under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).238
The GATT is a multilateral agreement designed to promote international
trade by reducing barriers.239 Initially enacted in 1947, GATT was later re-
placed in 1995 by the WTO, which adopted the text of the original GATT.240
228. See id.
229. Wolcott, supra note 3, at 165, 167.
230. See Procedures, supra note 223, at 48, 132.
231. See id.; Hagan, supra note 207.
232. See Procedures, supra note 223, at 132-33; Hagan, supra note 207.
233. See Procedures, supra note 223, at 132-33; Hagan, supra note 207.
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Most likely, any challenges to current U.S. policy would be brought under
GATT Articles I or XI.241
A. GATT Article I - Most-Favored Nation Treatment
Under GATT Article I, if a country provides a benefit for any product
coming from or going to a particular country, the same advantage must be
given to every WTO member (known as the "most-favored nation" (MFN)
treatment). 242 For example, if the United States imposes import or export
regulations that confer a benefit on one country, the United States must ex-
tend the same advantage to "like" products of every other WTO member.243
This requirement could potentially be violated by the expedited process cur-
rently in place for applications to countries with FTA agreements.
GATT does have exceptions to the MFN treatment.244 For example, Ar-
ticle XXIV allows countries to provide more favorable treatment to countries
with which they maintain an agreement (such as an FTA).245 However, the
WTO Appellate Body has held that while Article XXIV provides an excep-
tion to the MFN treatment, it does so only to the extent that it does not
conflict with any other GATT provisions.246 As will be discussed below, the
U.S. export restrictions on natural gas likely violate other requirements under
GATT, so the exception may not apply.247
B. GATT Article XI - Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions
The limitation on natural gas exports may violate GATT Article XI,
which generally bans quantitative restrictions on trade.248 The relevant provi-
sion of Article XI states:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other
charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export
licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by
any contracting party on the importation of any production of the
territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or
241. Smith, supra note 96, at 272-73.
242. Id. at 273; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. I, Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A-ll, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
243. Smith, supra note 96, at 273.
244. Id. at 273; GATT, supra note 242, art. XXIV.
245. GATT, supra note 242, art. XXIV; Smith, supra note 96, at 273.
246. Appellate Body Report, Turkey-Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Cloth-
ing Products, ¶ 64-66, WT/DS34/AB/R (Oct. 22,1999); Smith, supra note 96,
at 273-74.
247. Smith, supra note 96, at 274.
248. GATT, supra note 242, art. XI.
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sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any
other contracting party. 249
While the current regulatory process for natural gas exports is not a
prohibition, the public interest review may be interpreted as a restriction.250
The WTO Dispute Settlement Body has suggested, in many panels, that the
term "restriction" should be interpreted broadly: a program must simply have
an impact on trade to constitute a "restriction."251 Based on decisions from
the Dispute Settlement Body, an export licensing program is permissible if:
(1) the prerequisites for obtaining a license do not have a limiting or restric-
tive effect, and the agency's discretion in approving export applications is
sufficiently limited; or (2) the program falls within one of GATT's
exceptions.252
Initially, the test looks at whether the licensing system is restrictive. The
first aspect to consider is the prerequisites for licensure.253 In the case of the
DOE review, the application requirements are clearly set out.2 54 The regula-
tions allow the DOE to require the applicant and other parties to make sup-
plemental files of additional information; but this will likely not be seen as
restrictive because there are limitations as to what items the agency can re-
quest.25 5 Therefore, the DOE does not have unilateral authority to request
documents.256 Furthermore, the public disclosure requirements provide a
check on the DOE's discretion to arbitrarily request information.257
While the application requirements may not be in violation of Article
XI, it is possible that the public interest review is restrictive.258 The DOE
must balance a wide range of factors, with little clarity on how each factor
will be weighed. 259 Additionally, the process of requiring an EA versus an
EIS could lead to uncertainty as to how environmental considerations will be
taken into consideration.260 These factors would likely violate the limitation
249. Id.
250. Harmon, supra note 8, at 631.
251. Id.; Smith, supra note 96, at 275.
252. Panel Report, China-Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw
Materials, WT/DS394/R, WT/DS395/R, WT/DS398/R (July 5, 2011) [herein-
after Panel Report, China-Raw Materials]; Harmon, supra note 8, at 631-32.
253. Harmon, supra note 8, at 632.
254. 10 C.F.R. § 590.202 (2012); Harmon, supra note 8, at 633.
255. See id.
256. See Harmon, supra note 8, at 633.
257. Id. at 633-34.
258. Id. at 634.
259. Id. at 620-21, 634-35.
260. Id. at 635-36.
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on agency discretion. Therefore, the current regulatory scheme creates uncer-
tainty and likely is restrictive under Article XI.
Since the public interest review is likely restrictive, the next considera-
tion is whether the violations fall within one of the GATT exceptions.261
Under Article XX, an export restriction is justified when significant sover-
eign interests are at stake.262 For example, Article XX(g) allows for the con-
servation of exhaustible natural resources, and Article XX(b) allows for the
protection of human, animal, or plant life or health.263 For an Article XX
exception to apply, the restriction must fall within the intent of the justifica-
tion, and be applied in an even-handed way. 2 64
Article XX(g) allows a country to place restrictions on trade in order to
conserve their natural resources. 265 To use this exception the United States
must show that: (1) a primary goal of the public interest review is conserva-
tion; (2) the measure that will actually achieve the conservation purpose; (3)
there are comparable domestic requirements; (4) there are no less restrictive
alternatives; and (5) the restriction is applied in an even-handed way. 2 66
The DOE's public interest review likely meets the first two require-
ments. 267 The application process clearly shows that the environmental con-
cerns of the licensing process and reducing exports will avoid increases in
natural gas production.268 However, the public interest review may violate
the third requirement as there are no comparable domestic conditions.269
Next, as discussed above, splitting up the licensing process between two
agencies may be more restrictive than placing sole authority in one agency.270
However, the U.S. licensing system will probably meet the fourth require-
ment because the WTO is unlikely to second-guess how a country allocates
powers to agencies.271 Finally, the public interest review process may violate
the even-handedness requirement due to the broad and unspecified weighing
of factors.272 Without knowing exactly what factors are considered, and how
they are weighed, there could be concerns of discrimination.273
261. Harmon, supra note 8, at 631-32.
262. GATT, supra note 242, art. XX; Harmon, supra note 8, at 636.
263. GATT, supra note 242, art. XX(b), (g).
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Article XX(b) is another exception, which allows a restriction when it is
"necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health."274 The primary
focus when analyzing the public interests review is "whether the measure's
primary goal is environmental and public health interest oriented and
whether the measure is 'necessary' to achieve the environmental and public
health goal."275 Whether a measure is necessary depends on how much the
measure affects the goal, and the measure's relative restrictiveness. 276 Addi-
tionally, as with Article XX(g), the program must be applied in an even-
handed manner.277
As discussed above, the DOE's public interest review requirements will
likely evidence that environmental impacts are a primary concern. 278 Next,
the United States must show that the policy is "necessary." The first element
of necessity is whether the program contributes to mitigating environmental
impacts, which will likely be met "because the DOE can condition approval
of an application on implementation of pollution control measures."27 9 The
next element is the program's relative restrictiveness.280 As discussed above,
while it may be less restrictive to have only one agency make the licensing
decisions, the WTO is unlikely to second-guess the United States' assign-
ment of powers. 28 1 The public interest review may violate the requirement of
evenhandedness.282 The lack of clarity regarding the factors considered in the
public interest review could allow different applications to be treated
disproportionately.2 83
It is not clear yet how the WTO would interpret the public interest re-
view. However, based on various decisions from the WTO Dispute Settle-
ment Body, it is very possible that the public interest review and the overall
treatment of applications to export natural gas could violate GATT require-
ments.284 Regardless, the risk that the United States could be in violation of
our International agreements is reason enough to consider a change in the
regulatory scheme affecting natural gas exports.
274. See GATT, supra note 242, art. XX(b); Harmon, supra note 8, at 642.
275. Harmon, supra note 8, at 642-43.
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VI. EFFECTS OF INCREASED OIL PRICES
Not long ago, United States' LNG exports were projected to increase
substantially.285 This prediction was based on the large spread between natu-
ral gas prices in the U.S. international markets, mainly in Asia and Europe.286
However, this competitive spread existed when the price of oil was $100 per
barrel.287 Since mid-2014, oil prices have been cut in half, to around $50 per
barrel.288 These changes in the price of oil are due to a variety of factors, but
fundamentally the changes are caused by supply and demand.289 Global sup-
ply has increased more than demand.290 For example, the U.S. shale boom
has brought in massive amounts of oil.291 Furthermore, the recent Iran nu-
clear deal will loosen sanctions on Iranian oil, likely pushing oil prices even
lower.292 Examining how low oil prices affect natural gas markets interna-
tionally and domestically creates a picture of the future of United States LNG
exports.
A. Changes in International Markets
The natural gas market of Asia, the region with the greatest demand
growth, is perhaps the most affected by oil prices.293 As discussed above,
Asia has typically relied on long-term, oil-indexed contracts.294 This means
that oil prices directly impact natural gas prices.295 Accordingly, when oil
was $100 per barrel, Asian buyers would pay $7.88 over the total cost to
produce and ship United States LNG to Asia.296 However, lower oil prices
drove down gas prices, and now, by the time United States LNG arrives in
Asia, the price is roughly the same.2 97 Also, over the past several years there
has been a desire among Asian LNG buyers for index diversification, with a
285. Mart6n & Jiminez, supra note 9, at 2.
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move away from oil to Henry Hub.298 This desire was particularly attractive
when oil was $100 per barrel.299 However, as the price of oil has dropped, so
has the perceived need for using U.S. LNG for diversification.300
Another market significantly impacted by the rising oil prices is Europe.
Historically, European natural gas prices were oil indexed.301 Over the last
few decades, however, Europe's use of oil-indexed natural gas prices has
decreased.302 While reliance on oil-indexed prices is not completely gone, a
significant majority of natural gas volumes are now indexed to hub prices.303
Furthermore, Europe's uses of hub-based prices are expected to increase.304
The effects of low oil prices on European natural gas prices will be quite
different than in Asia.305 Because hub prices are completely disconnected
from oil prices, fluctuations in the price of oil will not directly affect natural
gas prices.306 However, with depressed prices in Asia, many countries could
redirect their volumes to Europe and, thus, push down natural gas prices.307
Therefore, indirectly, low oil prices could severely threaten the profitability
of U.S. LNG exports in Europe as well.
B. Changes in the United States Market
The first major impact on the U.S. market due to oil prices has been a
fall in demand for natural gas exports. 308 Recently, the EIA projected that
United States LNG exports would exceed 70 Bcm in 2020.309 This optimistic
prediction was based on the spreads between U.S. Henry Hub natural gas
prices, and prices in Asia and Europe.3'o A major reason for the wide spread
was the high price of oil.311 However, since June 2014, oil prices have
dropped roughly fifty percent.312 This drop has caused the spread between
298. Mart6n & Jiminez, supra note 9, at 5.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Goncalves, supra note 51, at 237-38.
302. Id. at 238; Mart6n & Jim6nez, supra note 9, at 5.
303. Goncalves, supra note 51, at 238; Mart6n & Jim6nez, supra note 9, at 5.
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U.S. and international natural gas prices to shrink dramatically.313 For exam-
ple, when oil was $100 per barrel, the spread between the cost of United
States LNG exports and Asian LNG import prices was between $6.40 and
$7.60 per MMBtu.314 If oil prices remain at current levels, this price spread
will shrink to between $.60 and $1.95 per MMBtu.315 Given the narrow
spread and transportation costs, exporting LNG seems much less compelling
than it once seemed.316 Projections for natural gas exports in 2020 have now
dropped to 40-50 Bcm.317
A result of the falling demand for exports is the delay or cancellation of
many U. S. LNG projects.318 Mature projects that have already received DOE
and FERC approval, and which have secured long-term commitments, will
likely move forward because once investment decisions have been made,
there is no going back.319 Projects will continue, but businesses will need to
consider lower profits from LNG sales.320 Projects at earlier stages of devel-
opment face a much more uncertain future.321 If a project has already secured
long-term commitments it might advance, albeit with the potential for signifi-
cant delays.322 Delays are common, as LNG projects require a significant
amount of capital, but companies will be particularly reluctant to make in-
vestment decisions during times of uncertainty.323 Projects that have not se-
cured long-term buyer commitments will likely be abandoned until spreads
widen again.324
Another significant effect of the low oil prices is a fall in the supply of
natural gas, as oil and gas companies are likely to scale back development.325
Many projects began when the price of oil was $100 per barrel.326 With cur-
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rent oil prices, these projects are less economical.327 The industry must
"adapt its cost structures to the new pricing environment."328 In the
meantime, investments will likely slow down.329 This issue is exacerbated by
the fact that currently producing oil fields are less profitable, giving compa-
nies less cash to invest.3 3 0 Furthermore, a significant amount of natural gas
comes from wet reservoirs.331 These projects were especially profitable be-
cause of the higher volume of natural-gas liquids.332 Low oil prices reduce
these reservoirs' profitability, reducing the incentive to drill.333
VII. PROJECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The argument over U.S. LNG exports is unlikely to end soon. With the
potential to be a net exporter of natural gas, parties will continue to battle for
the ability to expand to different markets. 334 Of course, many parties will also
fight to limit exports as well.335 Despite the criticisms raised by opponents of
increasing exports, it would be a good idea for the United States to alter its
regulatory framework and allow natural gas to be exported more quickly and
easily.
As discussed above, there are many reasons why natural gas exports
would be a benefit. First of all, while there are concerns about the effect of
natural gas exports on the domestic natural gas prices and the economy as a
whole,3 36 these fears are unsupported.337 Any price increase will not substan-
tially affect consumers,338 and will help fix many market inefficiencies
caused by artificially low natural gas prices.339 Furthermore, as the 2012
LNG Export Study showed, the United States would gain net economic bene-
fits from allowing more LNG exports.340 Next, environmentalists argue that
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natural gas production,341 but they ignore the other potential positive impacts
exports could have.342 For example, higher domestic natural gas prices will
allow renewable energy sources to develop and reduce the amount of coal
used worldwide.343 Lastly, while there are several negative effects of fracing,
fighting exports of natural gas is not the most effective way to combat these
effects. The fracing process is relatively new, and is rapidly improving. As
the technology improves, the negative effects will decrease. Furthermore, the
United States would be more successful in regulating the actual fracing pro-
cess rather than the products it creates. Finally, the United States has a rare
opportunity to gain geopolitical influence in foreign energy markets, which
would allow for stronger relationships with allies and disrupt the influence of
hostile nations.344
Not only are there policy arguments for easing restrictions on LNG ex-
ports, there are legal ones as well. The United States should be concerned
about continuing to place restrictions on the exportation of natural gas due to
its constitutional obligation to uphold binding international agreements. As
discussed previously, whether or not the current restrictions would be in vio-
lation of certain international agreements is uncertain.345 What is clear is that
to avoid such a risk, the framework for the licensing of natural gas exports
should be changed. There have been several promising suggestions for how
to revise the regulatory system to increase its efficiency and ensure compli-
ance with international agreements. 346
One possible solution is for congress to eliminate the distinction be-
tween FTA and non-FTA countries.347 This distinction makes no practical
difference and effectively serves only to draw out the licensing process. 348
Another proposal is to remove the public interest determination in the Natu-
ral Gas Act and deem that all LNG exports are consistent with the public
interest.349 This way, both FTA and non-FTA export applications would be
treated the same. 350 This would reduce government intervention in the licens-
ing of LNG exports and allow the market to naturally regulate.351 As can be
341. See, e.g., Eldean, supra note 55, at 449.
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seen from the recent fall in oil prices, the market has the ability to limit the
amount of exports.352
The DOE should also articulate better-defined criteria for the public in-
terest review.353 The DOE needs to clearly define its goals, and issue rules to
that effect.354 The current public interest criteria do not adequately simplify
the review process. 355 In addition to a list of criteria, the DOE should state
how they plan to balance those factors.356 This would give all parties in-
volved a clear view of how the public interest review is being conducted.357
These changes would allow the review process to move more quickly and
remove any fears that the regulatory process is arbitrary. 35 8
While low oil prices have significantly affected the natural gas industry,
some have pointed out that there is still hope for U.S. exports. 359 An execu-
tive from Exxon Mobil Corporation spoke about the future of LNG trade.360
He advised that the current licensing process is difficult and needs to be
changed.361 While conditions are tough, with the right regulatory change, the
United States could still participate in the global LNG market.362 Further-
more, David Montgomery, who worked with NERA Economic Consulting
on the 2012 Economic Impact Study, also spoke about the future of LNG
exports in the low-oil price environment.363 The idea that United States LNG
exports requires a wide spread between international and domestic prices is
deceptive.364 When the United States entered the export market, the spreads
would have quickly narrowed anyway. 365 The real risk, according the Mont-
gomery, is being late to the game.366 Whoever enters the market first will be
able to scare off competitors.367 If the United States has a licensing process
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that is longer than their competitors, developers may lose all ability to par-
ticipate in the market.368
Furthermore, The United States still has several advantages over their
competitors. 369 One is the low production costs and reliable supplies.370 An-
other advantage is the inherent flexibility in United States export contracts. 371
U.S. supply contracts normally have "full volume flexibility [. . .] and flexi-
bility to hedge feed gas price levels at Henry Hub."372 There is also typically
no destination clause, so producers have the ability to redirect volumes to the
location with the highest price.373 As a result, United States export flows will
be an important factor in LNG supply.374
CONCLUSION
Until relatively recently, the United States was debating the issue of
LNG importation. Now, due to the growth of natural gas production, they are
on the verge of becoming one of the largest LNG exporters in the world. The
prospect of LNG exports has brought hope of substantial revenue for the
United States, as new international markets would open up. However, export
proposals have been mostly met with regulatory red tape and policy
criticisms.
The growth of LNG exports has been slow, which is the result of a
complicated and arbitrary statutory and regulatory system. The DOE contin-
ues to apply its antiquated public interest review, which requires an unneces-
sary distinction between FTA and non-FTA countries. Furthermore, this
complex statutory and regulatory framework may violate obligations under
international trade agreements.
Restrictions on the exportation of LNG are not likely in the best interest
of the United States from a legal, environmental, or economic perspective.
Although there are some potential negative impacts from an increase in the
exportation of LNG, they will be balanced out by the gains from unrestricted
international trade. LNG projects already face many challenges to entering
into international markets, such as low oil prices. The United States should
not put up even more hurdles to participating in international gas markets; it
should make exports easier to allow for competition with other natural gas
producers. Without a simplified regulatory framework, the United States will
likely miss out on a unique opportunity for increased revenues and influence
in global energy markets.
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